From a 1972 "Presidential decision that the U.S. should maintain the 'current overall level of effort in its civil defense activities' and that there should be 'increased emphasis on dual-use plans, procedures and preparedness [for peacetime as well as attack emergencies] within the limitations of existing authority". (Chipman, CD for the 1980's, 1979, pp. 4-5) "The views and judgments of those in DCPA familiar with dual-use issues can be summarized as follows: (1) In general, the Federal view has been that attack preparedness is the primary objective of the CD program, with improved State and local readiness for peacetime emergencies being a secondary but desirable objective".The State and local vies is in general the reverse - attack preparedness tends to be seen as the secondary but desirable objective. (2) State and local CD agencies are responsible for preparedness for peacetime emergencies, under their own legislation, whereas the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 as amended, defines CD solely in terms of attack preparedness operations". (3) The historical record for two decades is conclusive that if the Federal Government wishes to develop attack readiness, it must provide full funding for the programs required. Examples include the procurement as well as the maintenance of radiological defense instruments, the shelter survey (started in 1962), development of local plans for use of shelters, crisis relocation (evacuation) planning, and training. (4) Local governments, including CD Directors, will however cooperate to the extent necessary to develop attack readiness in communities throughout the country, provided the Federal Government takes the lead and provides assistance on-site in attack-oriented planning, training, and related areas". (5) The State and local view that attack preparedness is primarily (though not entirely) a Federal responsibility is clearly consistent with both the Constitution and the Federal Civil Defense Act. (6) State and local concern for peacetime preparedness has increased progressively since the latter 1960's, influenced primarily by the ever-decreasing Federal budget and patent lack of commitment of CD attack preparedness, also by the climate of détente. Increased concentration on peacetime disaster has been seen as essential to their survival, by local and State CD agencies, as well as having merit in its own right and being their legal responsibility.... (7) State and local concern for peacetime preparedness has advantages for attack oriented preparedness, such as motivating State and local officials to commit some funds and effort to general emergency preparedness, in addition to the obvious desirability on the merits of saving live and property in a tornado or other peacetime disaster. Also, planning and training for peacetime emergencies has considerable benefit for attack readiness - as do local operations in an actual peacetime emergency.... (8) Assets provided under the civil defense program have been of great value in peacetime emergencies: Emergency Operating Centers have been used to good effect on many occasions... CD sirens are routinely used to warn the public of tornadoes..... (9) Reasonable attack readiness cannot be developed as a bonus or by-product of readiness for peacetime emergencies. The latter type of preparedness gets a community perhaps 20 or 30 percent of the way to a reasonable level of attack readiness - which requires a large number of additional, special systems and capabilities. (10) Developing attack preparedness, however, cannot help but improve local and State readiness for peacetime emergencies.... (11) The modus vivendi that has evolved over the past two decades is in general that the Federal Government provides full funding for uniquely attack-oriented systems and capabilities.... while the capabilities supported by matching funds are for the most part 'dual-use' in nature - necessary for both peacetime and attack emergencies (e.g., support of local and State CD staffs, or local warning systems). (12) This modus vivendi works well in practice, notwithstanding the difference in Federal as contrasted to State and local priorities and concerns. However, it is essential that balance be maintained: Some local and State governments, if left to their own devices, will emphasize peacetime disaster readiness to the exclusion of attack preparedness. That is, their notion of 'dual' use is not in fact dual. (13) The rhetoric, and to a degree, policy, of the Federal agency has varied over the years: In the early 1960's, nearly total emphasis on attack preparedness, under the accelerated CD program of President Kennedy; mid- and latter 1960's some recognition of peacetime preparedness; early to mid-1970's, stronger emphasis on peacetime preparedness.... FY 1977, attack-only (per OMB direction); FY 1978-1979, significant emphasis again on peacetime preparedness but with attack preparedness being the primary objective..... (14)..... (15) Opinion in Congress has been to the effect that attack preparedness is the primary mission, under the Federal Civil Defense Act, but that assistance provided under the Act can be used to prepare for peacetime disasters, provided this benefits both the attack and peacetime-preparedness missions. (16)..... (17) Many thus feel that FEMA would do well to stress attack preparedness while of course recognizing preparedness for peacetime disasters as a welcome bonus, and a significant and legitimate concern of States and localities. The latter can be relied on to add an ample tincture of emphasis on peacetime disaster readiness, so there is no compelling need for FEMA to stress peacetime preparedness at the expense (real or perceived) of attack readiness". (Chipman, CD for the 1980's, 1979, pp. 63-66)