Chapter I - Overview: (5) General Planning Considerations for CBRN Response: (A) (4) Sources of Radiation and Their Effects: (a) Radiological Sources. Radioactive materials cause damage by ionizing effects of neutron, gamma, x-ray, beta, and/or alpha radiation. A population may be exposed to radiation intentionally through two primary methods (other than a nuclear detonation): radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) or radiological exposure devices (REDs). RDDs and REDs require limited technical knowledge to build and deploy as compared with a nuclear device. Also, the radioactive materials used in RDDs and REDs are widely used in medicine, agriculture, industry, and research, and thus are far easier to obtain than weapons grade uranium or plutonium. Alternatively, any population can be unintentionally exposed to radiation released during an industrial accident or natural disaster involving a nuclear facility such as a nuclear power plant. (1) RDDs is an improvised assembly or process, other than a nuclear explosive device, designed to disseminate radioactive material in order to cause destruction, damage, or injury. Adversary use of an RDD - often called dirty bomb - is considered far more likely than employment of a nuclear explosive device. An RDD typically combines a conventional explosive device (such as a bomb) with radioactive material. RDDs are not designed to produce a nuclear detonation; rather, they produce a small area of acute immediate and residual hazard, and larger areas of delayed residual hazards. The immediate embedded in open cuts and sores or incorporated into food products growing in nearby agricultural areas. Inhaled materials can be dispersed throughout the body, captured by different organs and tissues, and remain internal hazards for a long time. Due to the unpredictability associated with radiation material dispersion over surfaces, the immediate surroundings may be littered with fragments of hazardous radiological source material. (2) REDs are covertly placed radioactive sources intended to expose people to significant doses of ionizing radiation without their immediate knowledge. Constructed from partially or fully unshielded radioactive material, a RED could be hidden from sight in a public place, exposing those who pass by. A RED does not distribute physical contamination (however, if the seal around the source is broken, radiological contamination may occur). The ability of a RED to cause injuries depends on several factors: the size of the source, type of isotope, distance and shielding materials between the source and personnel, and the length and/or frequency of exposure. Unless an installation routinely employs radiation detection devices and/or dosimeters, patients presenting to a medical facility with acute radiation syndrome (ARS) or radiation sickness will likely be the first indication of a RED's employment. (b) When responding to a radiological incident, the commander's priorities are to keep critical missions operating while keeping exposure of all personnel as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). ALARA guidance or parameters should be utilized to establish acceptable levels of contamination as prescribed by policy or the appropriate authority based on the CBRN incident. Unique post-radiological-incident challenges include determining personnel exposure (dose) rates; decontamination challenges; hazard duration that measures in months to years; and lifelong health concerns for personnel with even low level radiological exposure. The setting and managing of OEG by the operational commander is a key requirement in protecting forces