Chapter I - Overview: (5) General Planning Considerations for CBRN Response: (C) Operational Planning Considerations for a Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear Response: (2) Coordination Planning: (a) Interorganizational Coordination: DOD will liaise and coordinate with other agencies and civilian authorities. Interorganizational coordination is a continuous process that should be established and emphasized prior to an incident, as well as during and after an incident. Coordination takes place at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Whether coordination is conducted through the CCDR's joint interagency coordination group or other means such as an interagency planning cell or group at the combatant command or JTF levels, the importance of interorganizational coordination in the planning process cannot be overstated. of particular concern is information management and public affairs (PA). These activities are done in concert with DHS or the chief of mission (COM) and impacted nation, depending upon the operational environment. The NRF provides additional guidance for domestic situations. JFCs should be prepared to coordinate operational activities with technical nuclear forensics sample collection task force (TF) in the event of a response to a radiological or nuclear incident. The CCDR and staff will coordinate with the collection TF through DHS to the Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for national incidents and via DOS in response to a foreign RFA. Refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, for a detailed discussion on interagency, IGO, and nongovernmental organization (NGO) coordination during joint operations. (b) State and Local Coordination: Determine if specialized national, international, or local assets are responding to the incident. Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) enhanced response force packages (CERFPs) and homeland response forces (HRFs) coordinate through NG joint force headquarters-state (NG JFHQ-State) with state and local civilian response planners and responders to verify that the DOD CBRN Response Enterprise is synchronized with civil authorities. The state NG weapons of mass destruction-civil support team (WMD-CST) and the state HAZMAT coordinator also synchronize with state organizations and advise on specialized response assets and private resources (such as industrial resources) available for use during a response. Attempt to determine response capability gaps and seams that will require filling by DOD resources or capabilities, i.e., equipment, material, or personnel. These processes should be practiced during training events and exercises. (c) Federal Coordination: The CCDR and staff coordinate through DHS for national incidents and DOS for incidents involving foreign nations. These contacts should be verified with every training event. (d) Communications: Determine if communications infrastructure is intact. If not, or if it is overwhelmed, joint forces may need to augment or replace the communications infrastructure in the affected areas using organic equipment. This is particularly important in a nuclear incident with resulting EMP. It should be anticipated that normal civilian communications means (i.e., land-line, cell phone, Internet) will be greatly affected and should not be considered as primary means of communications during a catastrophic incident. (e) Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Technical Support: EOD personnel should be part of any response to a possible CBRN incident. Consider the potential for secondary devices designed to explode or release a CBRN hazard after EOD or CBRN hazard response personnel have arrived. Ensure reachback is possible for CBRN hazard disposition or other technical expertise. (f) Occupational and Public Health: Identify a lead medical/health DOD point of contact/liaison to provide support and recommendations regarding personnel and public health and safety including cleanup levels and risk assessments. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), CDC, and Occupational Safety and Health Administration may provide recommendations to the DOD regarding health and safety. (g) Biometric and Forensic Requirements: Where exclusive federal jurisdiction applies, coordinate with the appropriate military legal advisor to determine evidence collection procedures in case the incident is a criminal or terrorist act. Ensure that biometric evidence is vetted with the Biometrics Identity Management Agency and queried against authoritative federal biometrics databases: DOD Automated Biometric Identification System, DHS Automated Biometric Identification System, and the FBI Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System. (h) Transition and Disengagement: Plan for the termination of military support. This is a politically sensitive phase requiring detailed planning. DOD typically disengages from operations when the local authorities are capable of assuming the responsibilities for the response operations. This is generally when the immediate danger from the CBRN incident is eliminated, the capabilities to save lives are in place, and critical services are restored. DOD generally does not remain to conduct site recovery operations. (i) Legal Requirements: In both domestic and FCM, unique legal requirements may exist. Legal review by the assigned judge advocate should occur as the incident unfolds to ensure compliance with any such requirements. (j) Strategic Communication: Accurate and timely communication with the public is crucial. Themes, messages, images, and actions should be synchronized across jurisdictions, agencies, and organizations. Planning must include anticipated outages of civilian mass media capabilities for communicating evacuation and quarantine information