CBRN Safety 059
CBRN Safety 059 : Chapter I - Overview: (5) General Planning Considerations for CBRN Response: (C) Operational Planning Considerations for a Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear Response: (3) Logistics Planning: (a) Conduct Logistic Support: Providing logistic support for a CBRN response produces numerous challenges. The force may need to deploy with unique assets and specialized equipment depending upon the mission, situation, and the designated response force. Examples of such equipment include decontamination systems, mobile laboratories, field hospitals, medical equipment, and facilities for temporary accommodation of persons. Forces may also be required to operate and/or maintain unfamiliar equipment that will impact maintenance requirements and repair parts management. It is also likely that much of the most critical equipment will require decontamination or hazard mitigation procedures during daily checks, refueling, and maintenance. These additional requirements illustrate that the nature of such deployments require unique planning and significant joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) support to receive, organize, and stage the forces for follow-on operations. Plans should allow forces to rapidly deploy, conduct JRSOI, and successfully execute their mission immediately after a CBRN incident. Contamination mitigation needs to be inherent in all CBRN logistics response planning in order to contain the spread of CBRN contamination and to prevent the unnecessary loss of valuable US assets. The responsiveness of support forces influences the success of the mission and the trust of the population affected by the CBRN incident. Logistical planning should address the integration of logistical support for Title 10 and Title 32, USC, and state active duty forces. Logistical planning should also address support United States Coast Guard (USCG) forces if they are to be a part of the support operations. While the DOD CBRN Response Enterprise contains significant tactical-level logistics/support forces, it requires a responsive theater opening and theater sustainment capability to support it. (b) Deployment and JRSOI: DOD response units, with direction from the parent unit and Service, are responsible for coordinating and executing predeployment activities, movement to and activities at ports of embarkation, and arrival at ports of debarkation (PODs). The designated JTF, in coordination with the designated base support installation (BSI) commander and joint field office (JFO), coordinates activities for JRSOI activities. Depending on the situation, JRSOI of incoming Title 10, USC, forces may not be tied to a designated installation. It may have to be conducted through an abbreviated method of capturing personnel and equipment status without requiring the traditional deliberate JRSOI model. (c) Transportation: Planners must anticipate/plan that critical transportation routes and infrastructure may be disrupted by the incident itself or by secondary effects such as populace movement and emergency response efforts. Both primary and alternate transportation routes and staging areas need to be identified. The joint force headquarters staff coordinates movement restrictions and transportation safety and determines accessibility and status of the road network, aerial ports of debarkation (APODs), and seaports of debarkation (SPODs) within the operational area. The CJCS, by the authority of and at the direction of the President or SecDef, issues a deployment order (DEPORD) to deploy US forces supporting CBRN CM. (1) All transportation modes should be considered for providing support to the CBRN response including organic assets. The deployment of unit personnel, supplies, and equipment should be phased so as to not overwhelm throughput of PODs, road networks, and on-site reception and support capabilities. For those units that cannot deploy with organic assets, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) can provide deployment, employment, and redeployment common-user air, land, and sea transportation for forces engaged in domestic CBRN response operations. Due to the detrimental effects of aircraft contamination and the difficulties of decontaminating aircraft, operational commanders should consider all measures consistent with mission priorities and operational risks to debark uncontaminated or packaged decontaminated cargo, equipment, and personnel at uncontaminated or clean airfields. (2) USTRANSCOM also provides aeromedical evacuation, air refueling, and aerial port services to support CBRN response. However, in a contaminated environment, USTRANSCOM will not transport contagious and contaminated casualties within the aeromedical patient movement system. In extreme circumstances, there may be a requirement to move contagious index cases (approximately two) for evaluation or critical medical care. If patient movement is required, the involved GCCs, Commander, United States Transportation Command, and SecDef in consultation with medical authorities provide necessary prior approval. Logistic planners need to be cognizant of the potential issues pertaining to requirements for the staging, reuse, transportation of, and/or disposition of decontaminated or residually contaminated equipment used during the CBRN response. These issues could significantly slow the normal redeployment process. Planners also need to consider the impact of cleanliness policy initiatives involving the transport of contaminated patients/cargo. (d) Contracting Services: Critical contracting administration support is essential to expedite the procurement of services and material in support of any CBRN response. Logisticians should be familiar with the services provided by the Defense Contract Management Agency that support the CCDR. When contracting for supply, transportation, and services, logisticians should consider existing contracts already supporting military installations and other federal agencies in the operational area and contracts available through the state
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