Chapter II - Domestic CBRN CM (4) Considerations: (E) CBRN Response Operations: (2) Phase I: Deter (Anticipate): Continued situational awareness is vital to understanding the CBRN response operation parameters. The situation may warrant, due to indications and warnings, the CAP process to begin before a CBRN incident occurs. Determination of joint force command structure, the DOD anticipated response, and early and thorough collaboration with federal departments and agencies, state governments (including respective NG TAGs, commanders), and localities is paramount. Alerting and preparing the joint force may be directed through a CJCS warning order, planning order, or alert order; however, CBRN incidents may also occur without warning, resulting in accelerated procedures and the first notification being an EXORD. This EXORD guidance may possibly even be verbal. In this case, the operations would move directly into phase II, with relevant phase I tasks still requiring to be performed. During this phase, the DCOs and United States Northern Command situational awareness teams (NSATs) are employed post incident to provide assessments to USNORTHCOM and situational awareness to the JFLCC. (a) The assessment will determine the scope and magnitude of the incident; identify potential theater response forces; identify DCRF and C2CRE requirements to expedite response; and identify potential C2 node requirements. The senior individual of the assessment element serves as the CCDR's LNO to gain on-scene situational awareness and provide recommendations on the appropriate level of C2 and initial resources required for the CBRN response. (b) The assessment element may include a staff judge advocate (SJA), CBRN, medical, PA, mortuary affairs, operations, plans, logistics, law enforcement, and communications officers and selected subject matter experts to assist in developing the assessment and recommending an appropriate response. USNORTHCOM's standing JTF in support of CBRN CM, JTF-CS, trains and prepares for this mission by maintaining a 24/7 on-call command assessment element capability. Other CCDRs have standing site assessment teams or survey and assessment teams prepared for this mission. (c) Because the vast majority of Title 10, USC, capabilities for DSCA falls under USNORTHCOM, the JTF-CS NSAT procedures are included here as an example of assessment processes and actions. Following coordination with state civil and military officials (typically the state TAG or the NG JFHQ-State) and federal officials (to include the FCO, incident management assistance team, the DCO and other on-scene technical advisors), the NSAT makes an evaluation of potential shortfalls in federal and state capabilities, which may become requests for DOD assistance. The NSAT prepares its assessment shaped by its knowledge of CBRN effects, the harm or damage the effects may cause, and how to mitigate and manage the resulting consequences. The assessment identifies proposed methods of response, anticipated actions, and potentially required forces. Information gathered by the NSAT is developed, either independently or through the support of an appropriate joint planning group for CAP, into a commanders assessment using the Adaptive Planning and Execution format for a commanders estimate and forwarded to the CCDR. This document provides specific recommendations to the CCDR relative to the CBRN response effort, to include tailoring and supplementing the CBRN response force structure required to employ. (d) The NSAT assessment helps the CCDR conduct the mission analysis and prepare the commanders estimate with a recommended DOD COA to be taken in support of the incident and recommended DOD resources and capabilities for anticipated mission assignments. The commanders estimate identifies force to task capabilities required to accomplish anticipated DOD mission assignments. With SecDef approval and through CJCS direction, these capabilities are identified by the Services, CCDRs, and the DOD agencies. The CJCS EXORD identifies the designated forces allocated to the CCDR and specifies the type of command authority (normally OPCON) in steady state for exercises and mission execution. Additionally, it provides approval of purpose, desired effect, and COA to be taken in support of federal agencies for the CBRN response. (e) This phase ends when forces receive prepare-to-deploy orders and are staged and ready to deploy. Once a unit receives a DEPORD through its parent headquarters specifying OPCON by the receiving CCDR, the TF deploys LNOs to a location designated by the CJTF for establishing the JTF deployable headquarters. These LNOs provide C2 connectivity for dissimilar systems and pass situational assessments back to their TF as the situation develops. Simultaneously, each TF deploys an advance party to the BSI identified by the JFLCC or JFC for JRSOI and base support. JRSOI is the essential process that transitions deploying forces, consisting of personnel, equipment, and materiel arriving in theater, into forces capable of meeting the CCDR's operational requirements. The TF commanders should coordinate with the CJTF on rules for the use of force (RUF), arming status, law enforcement missions, intelligence support and restrictions, PA guidance, deployment priorities, and mission assignments (if known). Because of the nature of the most likely CBRN CM operations, forces will likely deploy into and remain in the JOA for the entire length of the CBRN response. Catastrophic incidents may require force rotation