Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction : (Gillmore Commission). Established by Section 1405 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105-261 (H.R. 3616, 105th Congress, 2nd Session) (October 17, 1998). Led to publication of: I. Assessing the Threat. December 15, 1999, 123 pages, and, II. Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. December 15, 2000, 191 pages. From 2nd annual report on five imperatives: We are impelled by the stark realization that a terrorist attack on some level inside our borders is inevitable and the United States must be ready. We are similarly convinced, however, that much of the legitimate fear associated with the prospect of a terrorist attack can be substantially reduced?. Specifically, we must: (1) craft a truly "national" strategy to address the threat of domestic terrorism conventional, cyber, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear from the perspectives of deterrence, prevention, preparedness and response; (2) empower a senior authority to be in charge of our overall planning and preparation in the Federal Executive Branch, with special emphasis on preserving our civil liberties in a time of emergency; (3) consolidate the Congressional approach to legislation governing domestic preparedness for such attacks; (4) concentrate much more serious attention on state and local concerns and capabilities;and (5) strengthen functional capabilities across all levels of government for intelligence collection and information sharing; planning; training, equipping and exercising; research and development; health and medical; and across all first responder stakeholders-fire, law enforcement, emergency medical services and emergency management". (Note: "To Our Readers"). On "Enhanced" FEMA: "We considered the prospect of providing additional authority and responsibility to the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The "FEMA Option" was appealing because of its designation as the Lead Federal Agency for "consequence management," and its existing statutory and regulatory authority for disaster response. But we likewise discounted that option for three reasons: (1) Domestic Only Responsibility-FEMA has a domestic-only focus. Once we made the determination that the Federal coordinating entity should have both foreign and domestic responsibility, this is not a viable option. (2) Autonomy and Neutrality Issues-Even if FEMA were given additional authority to oversee the programs and budgets of other Federal agencies for combating terrorism (including the authority to direct other agencies to detail personnel to FEMA), it is likely be the case that the exercise of that authority would be viewed by other agencies as parochial, creating the type of interagency "turf" issues that have arisen in other contexts. By the same token, the person in FEMA with the responsibility for this coordination would be answerable to an internal hierarchy and not likely, therefore, to have the requisite autonomy. (3) Lack of Visibility and Access-Injecting the responsibility for coordinating programs to combat terrorism into an existing agency with other programs was an issue. FEMA's responsibilities are much broader than simply consequence management for domestic terrorist attacks. Terrorism issues might be subordinated to FEMA's other programs. Moreover, the "director" of this activity in FEMA would not have the same measure of direct access to the President, as would the director of an entity in the Executive Office". (pp. E-1, E-2)
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