"....What all these stories have in common is a system that requires a demonstrated "need to know" before sharing. This approach assumes it is possible to know, in advance, who will need the information. Such a system implicitly assumes that the risk of inadvertent disclosure outweighs the benefits of wider sharing. Those Cold War assumptions are no longer appropriate. The culture of agencies feeling they own the information they gathered at taxpayer expense must be replaced by a culture in which the agencies instead feel they have a duty to the information-to repay the taxpayers  investment by making that information available... Current security requirements nurture over-classification and excessive compartmentalization of information among agencies. Each agency's incentive structure opposes sharing, with risks (criminal, civil, and internal administrative sanctions) but few rewards for sharing information. No one has to pay the long-term costs of over-classifying information, though these costs-even in literal financial terms- are substantial. There are no punishments for not sharing information. Agencies uphold a "need-to-know" culture of information protection rather than promoting a "need-to-share" culture of integration". (The 9/11 Commission Final Report on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, p.417� quoted in: �. (DHS, Capstone Doctrine Pub 1 Version 2.1 Draft, Chapter 8, Information Operations, 2008, p. 8-3).